I. "Competition" of mandatory rules
The classical approach to avoid or correct market failure is regulation. Our mandatory corporate law aims at avoiding or mitigating principal-agent problems between shareholders and managements, collective action problems in companies with widely spread ownership, and opportunistic behavior in the relationship between small investors and controlling shareholders.
There are however, additional problems with the regulatory approach of employing mandatory law. 1 As far as mandatory law means statutory law, adaptation to new circumstances may be particularly cumbersome and difficult. Statute law tends to petrify especially where vested interests stand in the way of a change. A further problem with mandatory law is that the rulesetting institutions will very often be provided with only limited information, both as far as the spectrum of possible constellations and different possible solutions are concerned.
One way out of this dilemma could be a competition of regulators: A working competition of (state or national) regulators rewarding the most efficient regulator would force them to adapt more quickly to changing circumstances (ROMANO [1993] ; SPINDLER [1998] For a thorough discussion cf. M.A. Eisenberg [1989] and the contributions in: Lutter/Wiedemann [1998] .
competition between regulators might not work well for several reasons (BAUMS [1996] ; BEBCHUK/ROE [1998] ).
Whereas competition of regulators is thought to put pressure on a defective system from the outside, the regulatory system can also itself, at least to a certain extent, provide for selfcorrection from within the system. It can offer various optional solutions, albeit each of them binding, and leave it to the market to find the most suitable and efficient. There are several instances where the legislator has already employed this regulatory technique. The choice between a one-tier or two-tier board in French corporate law comes to mind as a famous example (GUYON [1996] , 319). Whereas in this case the parties are free to choose between two different structures, corporate law admits in other cases to achieve a goal on different paths. Defective rules can thus be circumvented. The result itself may not be quite the same as originally wanted, and the way to it may be more costly. Nevertheless it is chosen in order to achieve a solution without incurring the cost and problems connected with defective regulation. The latter is thus rendered obsolete by practice which "contracts around it". Of course, "contracting around" a binding regulation by choosing another binding form is not always feasible. The cost of contracting around may be simply too high. Or the legislator may have blocked all other ways. At this point competition between regulators will have to come into play.
The regulatory approach of a competition between mandatory rules must not be confused with the passing of non-mandatory provisions or enabling rules by the legislator. The latter is not regulation in its specific sense. Non-mandatory provisions leave it to the parties whether they make use of these rules or invent new ones. These rules reduce transaction costs by providing a subsidiary regime for cases where the parties have deliberately chosen not to contract otherwise, and they fill in gaps where the parties have simply forgotten to do so.
The theory of self-correction in our system of mandatory (corporate) law is still in its infancy, and reflections on this point are very abstract (TEUBNER [1989] what follows I will first describe the structure of this merger according to the available information on this deal in the media. 4 Further sections will then try to explain why perhaps more obvious and less costly alternatives could not be taken.
II. The structure of the merger
There will be no true merger between Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft and Chrysler Inc.
Rather, a private German bank, Oppenheim KGaA, has founded a wholly-owned subsidiary ("Oppenheim Aktiengesellschaft", now renamed "Daimler-Chrysler Aktiengesellschaft"). The
Chrysler shares will be collected by an American trustee by means of a reverse triangular merger (cf. IV., below). This trustee will then bring in these shares into Oppenheim in exchange for Oppenheim shares. Hence Chrysler Inc. will afterwards be a 100 percent subsidiary of Oppenheim AG. 
VI.

Why no immediate merger of Oppenheim AG and Daimler-Benz AG?
Daimler-Benz AG will not -according to the reports in the media -be merged immediately into Oppenheim AG. Rather, in a first step Oppenheim AG will issue a public offer to the Daimler shareholders to exchange their shares for Oppenheim shares. Now assume that 80 percent of
Daimler's shareholders accept this offer whereas 20% do not. Oppenheim AG will then hold 80% of Daimler's shares and with that majority can, in a second step, effect a merger of
Daimler into Oppenheim AG ( § 65 Umwandlungsgesetz). Why this detour, why no immediate merger of Daimler-Benz AG and Oppenheim AG?
There are certainly various arguments. One important argument could be that with an immediate merger all former Daimler shareholders could ask for an improvement of the exchange ratio between Daimler and Oppenheim shares ex post whereas those who accept the public offer cannot. That has to be explained in more detail.
In mergers the exchange ratio between the new shares which the shareholders bringing in their company receive as a consideration, and their old shares which become invalid as a consequence of the merger, is fixed by the managements of the two merging companies. The shareholders of the transferring company who disagree with the exchange ratio may oppose the merger motion. They may also consent. In any event, if the merger motion has been passed by the majority necessary in such cases, they are free to challenge the exchange ratio before the court ( § § 15, 305 ff. Transformation Act). If the court finds the exchange ratio disadvantageously low to the detriment of the shareholders of the transferring company, it will order a cash payment out of the pocket of the company which has taken them over. Such an additional cash payment can perhaps be avoided at least regarding those shareholders who accept the public offer (step one) instead of being merged into Oppenheim later (step two).
The media have already raised the question whether the targeted exchange ratio will be disadvantageous for Daimler's shareholders: They are -according to the news reports -going to receive 57% of the new Oppenheim (Daimler-Chrysler) shares, Chrysler's shareholders 43%.
Market capitalisation of Daimler-Benz was however (one day before the merger plans were published), with $ 55 bn double Chrysler's. On the other hand, Chrysler's profit before tax was DM 7,9 bn (with a turnover of DM 105 bn) in 1997 as compared with Daimler's of DM 4,2 bn (with a turnover of DM 124 bn).
From the viewpoint of our analysis the question is whether our merger law is defective in providing for judicial review of the exchange ratio. One could argue as follows: A judicial correction ex post of an exchange ratio or of a bonus which has been negotiated by the agents of the parties to the agreement -the shareholders of the merging companies -is a defective, inefficient solution. As long as both parties are independent of each other 8 and well informed, there is no need to question or correct the bonus or exchange ratio which has been found by the parties. Such a rule, one could argue, will be anticipated and will raise the cost of mergers (in extreme cases: inhibit them).
This argument would however be wrong for two reasons. First, one side may have cheated the other and given misleading or wrong information on the value of the company. In cases of regular asset or share deals the buyer has a warranty-claim to reduce the purchase price or even the right of conversion. That is not however possible in mergers. The right to question the exchange ratio and ask for an additional cash payment takes the place of the remedies given in regular sales.
Furthermore the "agents" who have negotiated the exchange ratio for the shareholders, i.e. the managements of the merging companies, may have personal interests in the merger and therefore not act independently on behalf of their respective shareholders. That may be because they are pursuing a growth rather than a value maximizing strategy or simply because they hope for better payment by the enlarged firm.
9
For these reasons an independent review of the exchange rate appears to be a justified regulation.
That does not however mean that the solution found here -a public exchange bid as a first step before the actual merger -is a circumvention of this remedy for Daimler's shareholders. If the shareholder who is asked in a public bid to sell or exchange his shares receives the information which must be given to investors in public takeover bids, 10 and if he is free to accept the offer 8
Where one company holds shares of the other company and may thus influence the merger motion, other rules will, of course, apply.
As to the Daimler-Chrysler case the media questioned whether the German managers will receive stock options in the new company comparable to Chrysler's . As the merger between Oppenheim and Daimler-Benz has not yet been effected, this is as yet mere speculation.
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Cf. Uebernahmekodex der Boersensachverstaendigenkommission beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen as of Jan. 1st, 1998. -A further question is whether the Daimler-Benz management must or not, there is no need for an ex post review and correction of the bonus or exchange rate offered to him. The question remains, of course, how many Daimler shareholders will accept this bid, and how many will prefer to wait for the merger.
ask the shareholders for their consent to the whole plan in a general meeting and give further information to them. I do not discuss this question here.
